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MODIFYING AMATEURISM: A PERFORMANCE-BASED
SOLUTION TO COMPENSATING STUDENT–ATHLETES FOR
LICENSING THEIR NAMES, IMAGES, AND LIKENESSES
CHAZ J. GROSS*
ABSTRACT
Amateurism is evolving and the NCAA is paying for it. With the
NCAA’s focus set on preserving amateurism, it prohibited student–athlete
compensation for any activity related to sports. However, college athletics
are a lucrative business that generates its primary revenue from licensing
Division I men’s basketball and FBS football players’ names, images, and
likenesses. After years of criticism for its rules and regulations, the NCAA
faced antitrust scrutiny from both former and current student–athletes. In
2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the NCAA’s
restrictions on student–athlete compensation violated the Sherman
Antitrust Act. While the Court affirmed the decision to allow the NCAA to
increase scholarships up to the full cost of attendance, it denied forcing the
NCAA to allow student–athletes to receive cash payments.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision created a dilemma for the NCAA. Since
the NCAA may no longer restrict student–athletes from receiving
compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses, it must
determine how to compensate student–athletes while maintaining
amateurism. Along with compensation, the NCAA faces issues with Title IX
because the Court’s decision only allowed compensation for Division I
men’s basketball and FBS football players. Further, when determining how
to compensate student–athletes, the NCAA could face tax implications.
Considering the O’Bannon decision along with the possible Title IX and
tax consequences, the NCAA should incorporate performance-based
scholarships to compensate student–athletes and preserve amateurism.
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INTRODUCTION
Picture the star basketball player on one of the University of
California, Los Angeles’s historic teams.1 The team has just won the 1995
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) national championship,
and the athlete is a consensus All-American and has been voted the most
outstanding player in the tournament.2 A couple months later, the athlete is
selected ninth overall in the National Basketball Association (NBA) draft
and is destined for stardom.3 Fast-forward nearly twenty years later: The
fame and fortune has deteriorated, and the former star is now just a sixfoot-eight salesman at a Toyota dealership in Henderson, Nevada.4 After a
long day at work, the former collegiate star decides to visit his friend.5
While at his friend’s home, he comes across his friend’s child playing a
college basketball video game that displayed a playable avatar of the
former star’s younger self.6 The avatar depicted his same position, jersey
number, uniform accessories, home state, height, weight, handedness, and
skin color.7 The former athlete is perplexed that his likeness is being used
without his approval or compensation.8 This is the life of Edward
O’Bannon, who receives questions from fans every year during the NCAA
tournament about how much he receives in royalties for his old games that
are replayed on television.9 The answer is always the same: nothing.10
In August 2014, the Northern California United States District Court
decided O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, holding that the
NCAA violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by restraining trade through
* Notes Editor, Michigan State Law Review; J.D. 2017, Michigan State University College of
Law; B.S. 2012, Hampton University. The author would like to thank Marie Rauschenberger, Herman
Hofman, and Professor Bruce W. Bean for their feedback, time, and guidance throughout the Notewriting process, as well as the staff of the Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property for preparing
this Note for publication. Further, the author would like to thank the MSU Legal Education Opportunity
Program, the MSU Black Law Students Association, the Michigan State Law Review, and his family
and friends for their support and encouragement. Last, but certainly not least, the author dedicates this
Note to his parents, Glenda and William, for their unwavering love and support.
1. See Kurt Streeter, Former UCLA Star Ed O’Bannon Leads Suit Against NCAA Over Use of
Images, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/22/sports/sp-videogameslawsuit22.
2. See Steve Eder & Ben Strauss, Understanding Ed O’Bannon’s Suit Against the N.C.A.A., N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/sports/ncaabasketball/understanding-edobannons-suit-against-the-ncaa.html.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015).
6. See id.
7. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
8. See Eder & Strauss, supra note 2.
9. See Streeter, supra note 1.
10. See generally id.

262

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Vol 16:259

price fixing in the relevant markets for collegiate athletics.11 The NCAA
prohibited Division I men’s college basketball and Football Bowl
Subdivision12 (FBS) football players from receiving any compensation for
the use of their names, images, and likenesses in videogames, live-game
telecasts, and other footage.13 This decision marked a major change in
college sports, allowing Division I male college basketball and FBS
football players to receive compensation for the use of their names, images,
and likenesses in different media platforms.14 While some believe that this
opinion does not protect the amateurism of college sports and shifts the
focus away from education,15 others believe that it rightfully compensates
exploited student–athletes.16
However, in March 2015, the NCAA appealed the district court’s
decision.17 While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit largely
affirmed the district court’s holding, it vacated the district court’s decision
to allow students to receive cash payments separate from their educational
expenses for the use of their names, images, and likenesses.18 This decision
places a burden on the NCAA to determine a feasible solution to
compensate student–athletes for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses while maintaining its focus on amateurism and preservation of
consumer demand.19 In addition to preserving amateurism and consumer

11. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1009.
12. See David Albright, NCAA Misses the Mark in Division I-AA Name Change, ESPN (Dec. 15,
2006), http://www.espn.com/college-football/columns/story?id=2697774 (stating that the Football
Bowl Subdivision was previously known as Division I-A football, which consists of the higher revenuegenerating programs “that offer a maximum of 85 scholarships and play most of their games on
[television] in front of large crowds.”).
13. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1009.
14. Id. at 1005.
15. See James A. Johnson, It Is Not Time to Pay College Athletes, 25 NYSBA ENT., ARTS AND
SPORTS L.J. 80, 80 (2014) (“The student–athlete’s mind-set and purpose could become distorted. The
players could become more interested in making money than learning skills and information that will
assist them after their playing days are over[.]”).
16. See Robert A. McCormick & Amy C. McCormick, A Trail of Tears: The Exploitation of the
College Athlete, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 639, 645 (2010) [hereinafter Trail of Tears] (“Although the
NCAA asserts college sports are amateur and uses this argument to justify not paying its players,
college sports have become a highly commercial enterprise.”).
17. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
18. See id. at 1079; Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Increases Value of Scholarships in Historic Vote,
USA
TODAY
SPORTS
(Jan.
17,
2015,
4:31
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/17/ncaa-convention-cost-of-attendance-student–
athletes-scholarships/21921073/ (stating that prior to the court of appeals decision, the NCAA’s
representatives voted to increase the amount of expenses that are covered under athletic scholarships).
19. See Jon Solomon, Court Shuts Down Plan to Pay Athletes, Says NCAA Violated Antitrust Law,
CBS
SPORTS
(Sept.
30,
2015),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jonsolomon/25322621/appeals-court-agrees-ncaa-violates-antitrust-law (“[T]he US Ninth Circuit Court of
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demand, other potential problems, such as tax and Title IX20 implications,
may arise because the O’Bannon decision only allows for the compensation
of male college football and basketball athletes rather than all college
athletes.21
This Note proposes a solution to the amateurism with compensation
problem, suggesting that the NCAA allow conferences, colleges, and
universities to award student–athletes with performance-based scholarships
for both academic and athletic achievements.22 This proposal allows (1)
collegiate athletic programs to provide compensation to student–athletes in
all sports based on the school’s revenue from the use of students’ names,
images, and likenesses; (2) athletic departments to structure the amount of
money that is awarded to student–athletes in a way that prevents possible
tax implications and maintains the student–athletes’ amateur statuses;23 and
(3) the NCAA to reopen the market for video game development to
increase revenue and consumer demand.24
Part I discusses the NCAA’s restrictions on student–athlete
compensation, particularly its definition of “amateurism” and the scope of
athletic scholarship coverage; further, it reviews antitrust law and examines
the legal history of student–athletes’ attempts to receive compensation for
the use of their names, images, and likenesses.25 Part II introduces the
current state of student–athlete compensation with the O’Bannon trial and
appellate decisions, including the correlation between amateurism and the
relevant markets for licensing names, images, and likenesses.26 Part III
briefly identifies the possible Title IX and tax complications that may arise

Appeals upheld a lower court’s decision that NCAA rules restricting payment to college athletes violate
antitrust laws, but also determined that a federal judge erroneously allowed players to be paid up to
$5,000 per year in deferred compensation.”).
20. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2015).
21. See Erin E. Buzuvis, Athletic Compensation for Women Too? Title IX Implications of
Northwestern and O’Bannon, 41 J. C. & U. L. 297, 298 (2015) (“The NCAA faces public criticism and
legal action over its policies that prohibit compensation for college athletes, it has taken to using Title
IX as a defensive shield.”).
22. See discussion infra Part IV (providing a solution that would allow the NCAA to preserve
amateurism and compensate student–athletes for the use of their names, images, and likenesses).
23. See Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, “Show Me the Money!” – Analyzing the
Potential State Tax Implications of Paying Student–Athletes, 14 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13, 27 (2014).
24. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1067 (9th Cir. 2015).
25. See NCAA, 2015-16 GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT–ATHLETE 20, 24 (2015),
https://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/CBSA16.pdf [hereinafter NCAA 2015-16
GUIDE]; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir.
2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
26. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 993-98 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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because of O’Bannon.27 Part IV builds upon the analysis in O’Bannon to
develop a formula for implementing student–athlete compensation,
maintaining amateurism, and preventing Title IX and tax implications.28
I. NCAA RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENT–ATHLETE COMPENSATION
For over 100 years, the NCAA, as a self-governing entity, has
regulated and influenced amateurism in college sports, specifically for its
member schools.29 Since its inception, the NCAA has prohibited students
from receiving compensation for their participation in collegiate athletics. 30
In the mid-1950s, the NCAA developed the term “student–athletes”31 in
response to a Colorado State Supreme Court decision32 that an injured
college football player is considered an employee and therefore entitled to
workers’ compensation.33 The NCAA’s purpose was to change the public
perception of college athletes, while preventing further litigation and
mischaracterization of the athletes as employees.34 Shortly thereafter, the
NCAA enacted rules allowing its member schools to award athletic
scholarships to student–athletes.35 Although the NCAA has made several
revisions to its rules over the years, the NCAA has consistently prohibited
student–athletes from receiving any compensation outside of scholarships
or grants for their athletic ability, including the revenue generated from the
use of their names, images, and likenesses.36 The NCAA’s rules and

27. See Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athletic Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander
Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2347 (2014).
28. See generally Michael A. Carrier & Christopher L. Sagers, O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association: Why the Ninth Circuit Should Not Block the Floodgates of Change in College
Athletics, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 299, 308 (2015).
29. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
30. Id. at 973-74.
31. See NCAA, 2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 60, art. 12.02.13 (2015),
https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4388-2015-2016-ncaa-division-i-manual-august-versionavailable-august-2015.aspx [hereinafter NCAA 2015-16 MANUAL] (defining “student–athlete” as “a
student whose enrollment was solicited by a member of the athletics staff or other representative of
athletics interests with a view toward the student’s ultimate participation in the intercollegiate athletics
program. Any other student becomes a student–athlete only when the student reports for an
intercollegiate squad that is under the jurisdiction of the athletics department, as specified in
Constitution 3.2.4.5. A student is not deemed a student–athlete solely on the basis of prior high school
athletics participation.”).
32. See Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 429-30 (Colo. 1953).
33. See Trail of Tears, supra note 16, at 664.
34. See id.
35. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 974.
36. See id. at 974-76.
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restrictions have been the subject of several lawsuits, the most prominent
and recent being the antitrust scrutiny in the O’Bannon case.37
A. NCAA Regulations and Antitrust Law
The NCAA has strict rules regarding students competing in athletics.38
In order to compete in NCAA Division I or II athletics, one must be
certified as an amateur student–athlete.39 The NCAA Eligibility Center
determines amateur certification of all potential student–athletes for
Division I and II colleges and universities.40 There are eight categories of
pre-NCAA enrollment activities that student–athletes may not participate in
to become certified as an amateur, including accepting payments or
preferential benefits for playing sports, accepting prize money above your
expenses, and accepting benefits from an agent or prospective agent.41 Prior
to the O’Bannon decision, that list contained receiving a salary for
participating in athletics.42 After student–athletes receive their amateur
certification, Division I and Division II schools are permitted to provide
athletic scholarships that cover tuition and fees, room, board, and required
course-related books.43 In addition, student–athletes may qualify for
nonathletic financial aid such as merit academic scholarships and financial
hardship-based aid such as federal Pell Grants.44 Although athletic
scholarships may be awarded, the scholarships for Division I men’s
basketball and FBS football do not always cover the full grant-in-aid,45
which consists of tuition and all other expenses related to the cost of
attendance.46 The cost of attendance differs from the grant-in-aid because it

37. See id. at 963; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 120 (1984).
38. See NCAA 2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 25, at 24.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. (“The following activities may impact your amateur status: signing a contract with a
professional team; playing with professionals; participating in tryouts or practices with a professional
team; accepting payments or preferential benefits for playing sports; accepting prize money above your
expenses; accepting benefits from an agent or prospective agent; agreeing to be represented by an agent;
or delaying your full-time college enrollment to play in organized sports competitions.”).
42. See NCAA, 2014-15 GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT–ATHLETE, 20 (2014),
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/CBSA15.pdf [hereinafter NCAA 2014-15 GUIDE].
43. See id. at 27; Schools in the NCAA are separated in divisions based on the size of the athletic
program particularly the amount of men’s and women’s sports teams.
44. Id.
45. See NCAA 2015-16 MANUAL, supra note 31, at 189, art. 15.02.5 (“Financial aid that consists
of tuition and fees, room and board, books, and other expenses related to attendance at the institution up
to the cost of attendance established pursuant to Bylaws 15.02.2.”).
46. See id. at 188, art. 15.02.2 (“The ‘cost of attendance’ is an amount calculated by an
institutional financial aid office, using federal regulations, that includes the total cost of tuition and fees,
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encompasses the transportation expenses needed to attend an institution.47
Since athletic scholarships did not cover the full cost of attending college,
and student–athletes were not able to receive compensation for the use of
their names, images, and likenesses, Edward O’Bannon challenged the
NCAA’s rules under the Sherman Antitrust Act.48
Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, it is illegal to form any “contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in the restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States.”49 In order to prove a
violation under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, there must have been a
contract, combination, or conspiracy that unreasonably restrained trade
under either a rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis and affected
interstate commerce.50 The rule of reason51 is often the presumptive
standard and used instead of the rule of illegality in situations where the
restraint on competition is essential to the product’s availability.52 A
restraint violates the rule of reason when the harm it places on competition
outweighs its procompetitive effects.53 Initially, the burden is on the
plaintiff to show that the restraint creates significant anticompetitive effects
within the relevant market.54 Next, the burden shifts to the defendant to
provide evidence of the restraint’s procompetitive effects.55 If the defendant
satisfies this burden, then the plaintiff must provide less restrictive
alternatives that can achieve the same objectives as the restraint.56 The
NCAA has faced several antitrust challenges to its rules and regulations
over the years.57

room and board, books and supplies, transportation, and other expenses related to attendance at the
institution.”).
47. Id.
48. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2015).
50. See Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hairston v. Pacific
10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)).
51. See Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430,
436 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The rule-of-reason test requires the court to analyze the actual effect on
competition in a relevant market to determine whether the conduct unreasonably restrains trade.”).
52. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010) (citing Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984)).
53. See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063.
54. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
120; In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir.
2013); In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147-48 (W.D. Wash.
2005).
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B. Past Challenges to the NCAA Regulations
In 1984, the Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma brought
an antitrust action against the NCAA challenging its plan to govern the
televising of college football games.58 This case was the NCAA’s first
attempt at using its preservation of amateurism as a defense for regulating
college sports in an anticompetitive manner.59 Although the Supreme Court
ultimately ruled against the NCAA, it supported the NCAA’s role in
maintaining the tradition of amateurism in college sports.60
Between 2008 and 2013, there were several cases involving former
college athletes suing the NCAA, as well as Electronic Arts, Inc., for using
the former athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in video games.61
Several former student–athletes brought suits for right of publicity, but
received mixed results against Electronic Arts, Inc. and were dismissed
against the NCAA.62 As a result of the dismissals, the parties consolidated
claims in the antitrust suit against the NCAA in the O’Bannon case.63 With
both former and current athletes believing that the NCAA exploits their
publicity rights, the overall purpose of the lawsuit was to abolish the
NCAA’s rules prohibiting student–athlete compensation.64
II. O’BANNON AND THE CURRENT STATE OF COLLEGIATE SPORTS
For years, paying college athletes for licensing rights has been a topic
of debate among sports analysts, professionals, and scholars, and even
President Obama.65 The O’Bannon decision attempted to settle the debate,
58. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 120 (holding that the NCAA actions created a
monopoly in college football, but the rules were not illegal because it created competition in other
sports).
59. See id. at 101 (stating that the NCAA has a historic role in preserving and encouraging
intercollegiate amateur athletics).
60. See id. at 120.
61. See In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1272
(9th Cir. 2013) (holding that Electronic Arts violated the plaintiff’s right of publicity for the use of his
likeness in a video game); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that a
former student–athlete did not qualify for right of publicity protection for use of his likeness as a
photograph in a video game).
62. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d at 1272; see also
Hart, 717 F.3d at 175-76.
63. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
64. See id. at 963.
65. See Dave Jamieson, Obama Calls On NCAA To Rethink The Way It Protects And Punishes
Athletes, HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/21/obama-ncaascholarships_n_6911804.html (quoting President Obama, “What does frustrate me is where I see
coaches getting paid millions of dollars, athletic directors getting paid millions of dollars, the NCAA
making huge amounts of money, and then some kid gets a tattoo or gets a free use of a car and suddenly
they’re banished . . . [t]hat’s not fair”).
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stating that the NCAA may not prohibit student–athlete compensation;
however, it did not state that the NCAA had to compensate student–
athletes, which led to the NCAA simply removing licensing rights.66
Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision to allow student–athletes
to receive compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses,
it vacated the district court’s suggested method for compensation.67 Along
with this decision, the NCAA must consider the possibility of Title IX and
tax problems when determining how to compensate student–athletes and
maintain the amateurism of college sports.68
A. O’Bannon v. NCAA: The District Court Decision
In 2014, Edward O’Bannon led a group of former and current college
student–athletes in an antitrust suit against the NCAA, challenging its
restrictions on student–athlete compensation, specifically for Division I
men’s basketball and FBS football players.69 The NCAA’s rules prohibited
student–athletes from receiving compensation for the revenue generated
through the NCAA and its member schools’ licensing of the rights to use
student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in live game telecasts,
videogames, and other archival footage such as highlights and
rebroadcasts.70 The plaintiffs’ contention was that the restraint caused
anticompetitive effects on the college-education and group-licensing
markets.71
1. Price Fixing in the College Education Market
The college-education market is where colleges and universities
compete for student–athletes to play FBS football or Division I men’s
basketball.72 Each school offers higher education and athletic opportunities
to recruits in exchange for their services and consent to use their names,
images, and likenesses while enrolled; however, the athletes are responsible

66. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007-08; Johnson, supra note 15, at 81 (quoting NCAA
general counsel, Donald Remy, “We’re prepared to take this all the way to the Supreme Court if we
have to”).
67. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015).
68. See Buzuvis, supra note 21, at 298.
69. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963.
70. See id.; NCAA 2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 25, at 24 (stating that student–athletes may not
receive payments or preferential benefits for playing sports).
71. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963 (“Plaintiffs contend that these rules violate the Sherman
Antitrust Act.”).
72. See id. at 965 (“[S]chools compete to sell unique bundles of goods and services to elite
football and basketball recruits.”).
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for any cost of attendance that is not covered in the scholarship.73 Price
fixing occurs when the NCAA requires its schools to charge every recruit
the same amount for this opportunity and prohibits schools from offering a
lower cost and cash rebate.74 The NCAA contended that FBS football and
Division I men’s basketball programs compete with programs from other
divisions as well as minor leagues and foreign professional leagues,75
which prevents them from price fixing in this market.76
However, the plaintiffs argued that non-Division I colleges and
universities generally offer lower levels of athletic competition, training
facilities, and coaches.77 Additionally, Division II schools offer partial
athletic scholarships, while Division III schools do not offer athletic
scholarships at all, making the cost of attendance higher than FBS football
and Division I basketball schools.78 Moreover, foreign professional and
minor league79 opportunities do not offer the opportunity to earn a higher
education.80 Therefore, the court held that Division I schools are in an
exclusive market where the NCAA’s rules place a cap on the value of
grant-in-aid that is offered to potential student–athletes and prevents
student–athletes from receiving compensation for the use of their names,
images, and likenesses.81

73. See id. at 966; Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student–
Athlete: the College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 118 (2006) [hereinafter Myth of the
Student–Athlete] (“NCAA rules forbid players from accepting cash or other gifts from non-family
members, and even gifts from family and guardians are limited to an amount which, when combined
with any grant-in-aid, covers only the cost of attendance.”).
74. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 988 (“[I]n absence of this agreement, certain schools would
compete for recruits by offering them a lower price for the opportunity to play FBS football or Division
I basketball while they attend college.”).
75. See
Chris
Broussard,
Exchange
Student,
ESPN,
(May
19,
2009),
http://www.espn.com/espnmag/story?id=3715746&section=magazine (stating that current NBA player
Brandon Jennings elected to play and focus on the game of basketball in Italy because he did not reach
the required minimum standardized test score to qualify for an NCAA scholarship).
76. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 987.
77. See id.
78. See id.; NCAA 2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 25, at 31 (“NCAA Divisions I and II schools
provide more than $2.7 billion in athletics scholarships annually to more than 150,000 student–athletes.
Division III schools do not offer athletics scholarships.”).
79. See Pete Thamel, D-League Graduate Sets New Course to the N.B.A. Draft, N.Y. TIMES, (June
22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/sports/basketball/23draft.html (identifying Latavious
Williams as the first American high school player to choose to play in the NBA Development League
instead of attending college).
80. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 987 (stating that professional leagues, like arena football,
NBA developmental league, and foreign basketball and football, do not offer the same opportunities for
higher education and national exposure as FBS football and Division I basketball).
81. See id. at 988-89 (citing White v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. CV 06-999-RGK
MANX, 2006 WL 8066802 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2006)).
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2. Price Fixing in the Group Licensing Market
Within the group-licensing market are television networks, videogame developers, and other third parties.82 These entities compete within
their respective submarkets for group licenses to use the names, images,
and likenesses of FBS football and Division I men’s basketball players in
live telecasts, video games, and highlight clips.83 These entities are the
primary users of student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses, and are
often very influential in determining which schools the athletes choose to
attend because of the opportunities for exposure.84
a. Live Game Telecasts
Television networks negotiate deals exclusively with the universities
and conferences to acquire student–athletes’ rights because the NCAA
prohibits student–athletes from licensing the rights to their names, images,
and likenesses.85 However, the court noted that even without the NCAA’s
restrictions, it is not certain that there would be competition between
groups of student–athletes to sell the rights for the use of their names,
images, and likenesses.86 Furthermore, competition is unlikely because a
television network would have to obtain licenses from every team that
could potentially participate in a particular athletic event such as a playoff,
bowl, or championship game.87 Since there was not a direct restraint on
competition in this particular market, the court held that the NCAA rules
did not harm competition under the Sherman Antitrust Act.88
b. Video Games
Videogame developers and intermediate buyers compete for group
licenses to use student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.89 The
NCAA contended that this market would not exist even if student–athletes
were permitted to sell their rights because some conferences recently
82. See id. at 993.
83. See id.
84. See id. (stating that television networks compete for the rights to telecast lives games); Ahmed
E. Taha, Are College Athletes Economically Exploited?, 2 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 69, 87 (2012)
(“Successful, popular teams appear often on national television, giving media exposure to the student–
athletes on the team.”).
85. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 993-94.
86. See id. at 995.
87. See id. (“For instance, a network seeking to telecast a conference basketball tournament would
have to obtain group licenses from all of the teams in that conference.”).
88. See id.
89. See id. at 997 (describing intermediate buyers as those who bundle student–athletes’ rights
with others’ rights to sell them to video game developers).
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decided to stop licensing their intellectual property for use in video
games.90 However, the court noted that developers do not need all NCAA
schools and conferences to create a video game.91 As long as there are a
sufficient number of schools, there is competition in this market, and
student–athletes’ group licenses could possibly exist.92 Even though
competition could exist in this market, the court held that it is unlikely
because past video games often included almost every FBS football and
Division I men’s basketball school and conference.93 Moreover, the
challenged NCAA rules do not affect competition because trade within this
market has stopped due to lawsuits against videogame developers such as
Electronic Arts, Inc.94
c. Game Rebroadcasts, Highlight Clips, and Other Archival Footage
The NCAA uses a third-party agent, T3Media, which is assigned to
negotiate and manage all licensing related to archival footage.95 T3Media is
prohibited from licensing any current student–athletes’ footage and is
required to obtain the right to use the names, images, and likenesses of any
former student–athlete that appears in licensed footage.96 Under these
arrangements, no current or former student–athletes are deprived of
compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses in
rebroadcasted games.97 As a result, the court held that there is no
opportunity for competition in this market for any former student–athlete
that decides not to relinquish the rights to use his name, image, or likeness
in the rebroadcast of archival footage because a license is needed from
every team that has ever competed in order to license all of the NCAA’s

90. See id. (stating that without the NCAA and its conferences’ intellectual property, the video
game developers would not be able to produce a marketable product).
91. See id.
92. See id. (“Mr. Linzner specifically testified at trial that [Electronic Arts, Inc.] remains
interested in acquiring the rights to use student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses and would seek
to acquire them if not for the NCAA’s challenged rules . . . .”).
93. See id. at 998.
94. See id.
95. See id. (defining archival footage as game rebroadcasts, highlight clips, and other footage for
entertainment and advertisement).
96. See id.; NCAA, Digital Highlight and Footage Use Policy for Participating Member
Institutions
and
Conferences,
NCAA
DIGITAL
http://i.turner.ncaa.com/sites/default/files/images/2015/04/28/201415_ncaa_champs_digital_highlights_policy_-_schools_-_version_2.pdf (“For the NCAA Division I
Championships . . . [d]igital [h]ighlights may be used from NCAA.com or they must be licensed from
T3 Media.”).
97. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 998.
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footage.98 Therefore, the NCAA’s restrictions have not restrained trade for
student–athletes in the group licensing market.99
3. NCAA’s Procompetitive Justifications for Restraint
As stated in the National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents
of University of Oklahoma, the alleged purpose of the NCAA’s restrictions
was to preserve amateurism in college sports.100 The idea is that preserving
amateurism helps the NCAA maintain competition among universities,
integrate academics and athletics, and increase the national exposure of
college sports.101 While the NCAA contended that amateurism has always
been focused on the student–athlete receiving an education, history shows
that the amateurism rules have not remained consistent.102
a. Preserving Amateurism
Throughout the years, the NCAA has made crucial changes to its
amateurism rules.103 Initially, amateurism began with participation in sports
solely for pleasure and prohibited student–athlete recruitment using illicit
payments.104 However, many schools ignored these rules, leading to the
development of the Sanity Code, which provided enforcement in awarding
financial aid without considering athletic ability.105 Just a few years after
implementing the Sanity Code, the NCAA again changed its rules,
allowing schools to award athletic scholarships.106 The court stated that
with the current restrictions on student–athlete compensation, it is difficult
for the NCAA to use amateurism as a legal justification because the cap
that is placed on athletic-based financial aid does not support a focus
toward higher education for student–athletes.107 Rather, the cap on athletic-

98. See id. (stating that a group of student–athletes would not have an incentive to compete).
99. See id.
100. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120
(1984) (“The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in
college sports.”).
101. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999-1004.
102. See id. at 973 (“The historical evidence presented at trial, however, demonstrates that the
association’s amateurism rules have not been nearly as consistent as Dr. Emmert represents.”).
103. See id. at 974.
104. See id. (“[T]he association adopted a new rule stating that an amateur was ‘one who
participates in competitive physical sports only for pleasure, and the physical, mental, moral, and social
benefits directly derived therefrom.’”).
105. Id. (“The Sanity Code required that financial aid be awarded without consideration of
[athletic] ability.”).
106. See id. (“In 1956, the NCAA enacted a new set of amateurism rules permitting schools to
award athletic scholarships to student–athletes.”).
107. See id. at 975.

2017

MODIFYING AMATEURISM

273

based financial aid is more likely to entice men’s basketball and football
student–athletes, who have the opportunity, to focus more on their athletic
endeavors because of the possibility of becoming professional athletes.108
b. Maintaining Competition Among Universities
The NCAA introduced the idea of competitive balance as a reason for
its compensation restraints.109 The NCAA’s view was that maintaining a
certain level of competitive balance is necessary to create and sustain
consumer demand for Division I men’s basketball and FBS football.110
However, the court stated that the restrictions have not shown any impact
on competition.111 Rather than compensating student–athletes, schools
merely spend more money on coaches and personnel, recruiting trips, and
training facilities.112 The current situation would be no different than a
scenario where student–athletes were compensated because the schools
with the largest budgets would always attract the cream of the crop.113
c. Integrating Academics and Athletics
The NCAA claims that its restrictions promote the integration of
education and athletics.114 In particular, the NCAA stated that student–
athletes generally have better academic and employment opportunities than
other people from their socioeconomic backgrounds.115 However, the
108. See Jeffery L. Harrison & Casey C. Harrison, The Law and Economics of the NCAA’s Claim
to Monopsony Rights, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 923, 948 (2009) (stating that athletes would be more likely
to stay in college longer if they were earning some income for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses).
109. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 978.
110. See id.
111. Id. (relying Dr. Noll’s testimony, which presented studies from numerous sports economists
showing that the NCAA’s amateurism rules do not have a substantial effect on its desired level of
competitive balance).
112. See id.; Chris Isidore, College Coaches Make More Money Than Players Get in Scholarships,
CNNMONEY, (Jan. 11, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/11/news/companies/college-coaches-payplayers-scholarships/ (stating that during the 2014–2015 school year, 535 coaches in men’s college
sports earned a total of $440 million, while a total of $426 million was spent on male student–athlete
scholarships).
113. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 979; Matthew J. Parlow, The Potential Unintended
Consequences of the O’Bannon Decision, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 203, 208 (2014) (“[A]
dramatic increase in college athletic compensation could create a tale of two universities—that is, a
small group of well-funded colleges and universities that would able to pay the elite high school
athletes to matriculate on the one hand and the vast majority of other schools that would be unable to
compete for elite talent on the other hand.”).
114. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 979; Taha, supra note 84, at 83 (“As a group, football and
men’s basketball players enter college with lesser academic skills and aptitudes than do other students
at their colleges.”).
115. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 980 (“Dr. Heckman found that these benefits are particularly
pronounced for student–athletes from disadvantaged backgrounds.”).
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NCAA’s claim failed to consider college athletes from socioeconomic
backgrounds with higher incomes who could afford to attend college
without an athletic scholarship.116 Although student–athletes tend to have
employment and academic benefits, the NCAA did not provide evidence
that its restrictions on student–athlete compensation are the specific reason
for these benefits.117
However, one the NCAA’s experts made a plausible argument that
compensating college athletes with large sums of money could cause a
separation between the student–athletes and the rest of the student body on
campus.118 With such a large income from their success, student–athletes
may be more inclined to socialize off-campus and become sidetracked from
their academic endeavors.119 Even with these possible hindrances to
student–athletes’ academic and educational values, the court held that the
NCAA’s restraints on student–athlete compensation did not serve to
enhance academic success for college athletes.120
d. Increasing Exposure
The NCAA believes its regulations on amateurism increase the
number of opportunities that schools and student–athletes have to compete
on a national level.121 The NCAA and its conference officials’ claim is that
the upward trend in participation in FBS football and Division I men’s
basketball is because of the commitment to amateurism as opposed to the
increased revenue and televised exposure.122 Moreover, because of the
restrictions, lower income schools can afford to participate in Division I
competition.123 Yet, some schools in major conferences have expressed
desire to change the restrictions on amateurism.124 In addition, there was no
116. See id.
117. See id. (stating that student–athletes enjoy long-term benefits from “their increased access to
financial aid, tutoring, academic support, mentorship, structured schedules, and other educational
services that are unrelated to the challenged rules in this case”).
118. See id. (presenting testimony from university administrators stating, “depending on how much
compensation [is] ultimately awarded, some student–athletes [may] receive more money from the
school than their professors”); Johnson, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
119. See Johnson, supra note 15 (“The bottom line is that the focus should be and remain on higher
education.”).
120. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1003 (“As with the NCAA’s amateurism justification,
however, the NCAA may not use this goal to justify its sweeping prohibition on any student–athlete
compensation, paid now or in the future, from licensing revenue generated from the use of student–
athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.”).
121. See id. at 1003-04.
122. See id. at 1004 (stating that the NCAA attracts schools with its commitment to amateurism).
123. See id.
124. See id. (“[S]ome Division I conferences have sought greater autonomy from the NCAA
specifically so that they could enact their own rules, including new scholarship rules.”).
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evidence showing that allowing compensation would prevent low-income
school participation.125 This led the district court to believe that allowing
student–athletes to receive compensation could not only increase
participation in Division I athletics, but also create more opportunities for
national exposure to college sports in general.126
4. Alternative Restrictions and Remedies
The district court proposed several alternative restrictions and
remedies that would allow the NCAA to comply with fair competition.127
First, the court stated that the NCAA could allow Division I men’s
basketball and FBS football student–athletes to receive stipends from
schools up to the full cost of attendance with funds generated from
licensing revenues.128 Alternatively, the court stated that the NCAA could
permit schools to have a trust holding limited and equal shares of their
respective licensing revenues to be distributed to the student–athletes after
they leave college or their eligibility has expired.129
After exploring possible alternative restrictions and remedies to the
NCAA’s rules against compensation, the district court concluded that the
NCAA’s challenged rules unreasonably restrained trade and violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act.130 The court specified that prohibiting student–
athletes from ever receiving any compensation for the use of their names,
images, and likenesses restrains price competition among Division I
schools as suppliers of an unique combination of academic and athletic
opportunities.131 This decision ultimately led to an appeal as well as the
NCAA increasing the value of athletic scholarships to cover the full cost of
attendance and allowing its member schools to grant deferred cash
payments up to $5,000 per year.132

125. See id. (“[T]here is no evidence that those cost savings are being used to fund additional teams
or scholarships.”).
126. See id.
127. See id. at 982.
128. See id. at 1005; Edelman, supra note 27, at 2335 (“[R]aising the permissible grant-in-aid limit
that schools may award to their athletes in stipends.”).
129. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (stating that NCAA could limit compensation to only the
revenue generated from the licensing of student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses).
130. See id. at 1007 (“The challenged rules do not promote competitive balance among FBS
football and Division I basketball teams, let alone produce a level of competitive balance necessary to
sustain existing consumer demand for the NCAA’s FBS football and Division I basketball-related
products.”).
131. See id. (“The challenged rules do not promote competitive balance among FBS football and
Division I basketball teams, let alone produce a level of competitive balance necessary to sustain
existing consumer demand for the NCAA’s FBS football and Division I basketball-related products.”).
132. See Berkowitz, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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B. The NCAA Appeals to the Ninth Circuit
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that
the NCAA’s rules against compensating student–athletes for the use of
their names, images, and likenesses violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.133
Furthermore, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision that student–
athletes were injured as a result of the NCAA’s compensation rules because
such rules have closed the market for using the students’ names, images,
and likenesses in video games.134 While the Court reaffirmed the decision
to allow NCAA member schools to award grants-in-aid up to the full cost
of attendance, it vacated the decision to allow students to receive cash
payments for the use of their names, images, and likenesses.135 The Court
reasoned that neither a rule against nor a rule permitting compensating
student–athletes for their names, images, and likenesses would be effective
in promoting amateurism and preserving the consumer demand.136 Even
though the NCAA’s restrictions violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
Court stated that providing students with cash compensation would deprive
the NCAA of its core value of amateurism.137 Likewise, compensating
students with yearly cash payments would convert college athletics from an
amateur league to a minor league.138 Further, the majority noted that the
district court incorrectly reasoned that allowing smaller cash payments as
opposed to larger payments would preserve amateurism.139 The Court
believed the problem is that offering student–athletes compensation
unrelated to educational expenses erases the rule of amateurism.140
However, the dissent stated that based on the experts’ testimony,
allowing students to receive small payments would not have a significant
effect on consumer demand.141 In fact, one of the experts established that
consumer interest rose in professional sports when salaries increased, but
this analogy conflicts with collegiate athletics because the focus is toward
133. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
134. See id. at 1067 (“[Electronic Arts, Inc.’s] inability to use college athletes’ [names, images, and
likenesses] was the ‘number one factor holding back NCAA video game growth.’”).
135. See id. at 1075-77.
136. See id. at 1076.
137. See id. (stating that “amateurism is an integral part to the NCAA’s market”).
138. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102
(1984) (stating that college sports must be differentiated from professional sports unless they become
minor leagues).
139. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1077 (stating that the district court should have addressed the
effectiveness of smaller cash payments in promoting amateurism).
140. See id. at 1078.
141. See id. at 1080 (basing its argument on the fact that FBS football players can receive Pell
grants in excess of the cost of attendance and tennis players may receive prize money up to $10,000
prior to enrolling in school).
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amateurism.142 The primary distinction between the majority and dissenting
opinions is whether the antitrust analysis should be focused toward
amateurism or consumer demand.143
While maintaining both amateurism and consumer demand are
essential to resolving this dispute, other legal problems may arise.144 The
NCAA faces Title IX issues when considering compensating only men’s
basketball and football players.145 Further, the NCAA faces the possibility
of income taxes, which is contrary to its amateurism policy.146
III. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE O’BANNON DECISION
The central dispute throughout O’Bannon was compensating Division
I men’s basketball and FBS football student–athletes for the revenue
generated from licensing their names, images, and likeness.147 While the
NCAA’s concern was maintaining the amateurism and consumer demand
of college sports, the decision nonetheless brought about other potential
legal problems.148 In addition to determining the best approach to
compensating student–athletes, the NCAA faces a Title IX obstacle and
possible problems with income taxes for the money it could potentially
provide to the student–athletes.149
A. Drop a Dime for Title IX
Educational institutions, particularly their athletic departments, are
constantly monitoring their activities to ensure that they are in compliance
with Title IX.150 Title IX is a civil rights law commonly known for

142. See id. at 1081 (stating that the popularity of major league baseball increased when players’
salaries rose).
143. See id. (Thomas, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the difference in opinion refers to the
procompetitive interest at stake and whether the alternative of compensating student–athletes is as
effective in preserving amateurism).
144. See id.; Parlow, supra note 113, at 212 (“Just as importantly, there will almost certainly be
Title IX implications and effects based on the O’Bannon decision and potential changes in the
collegiate athletic system.”).
145. See Buzuvis, supra note 21 (“[T]he NCAA argues that paying athletes in revenue sports,
coupled with the commensurate obligation under Title IX to pay female athletes, would be prohibitively
expensive for college athletics as we know it.”).
146. See Kissa-Schulze, supra note 23.
147. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
148. See Buzuvis, supra note 21 and accompanying text; Kissa-Schulze, supra note 23.
149. See Buzuvis, supra note 21 and accompanying text; Kissa-Schulze, supra note 23.
150. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (2014) (“Any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary
school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an
educational institution composed of more than one school, college, or department which are
administratively separate units, such term means each such school, college, or department.”).
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prohibiting discrimination against women in programs or activities that
receive federal financial assistance such as college sports.151 The primary
concern is preferential treatment with the imbalance in participation or
receipt of federal benefits such as financial assistance to members of one
sex.152
In order to comply with Title IX, colleges and universities must offer
an equal amount of funds to women’s athletics as they do to men’s
athletics.153 Unfortunately, female college athletic programs typically do
not generate the same amount of revenue as male college athletic
programs.154 As shown in the figures below, which provide the revenues,
expenses, and profits of the University of Florida’s men and women’s
athletic programs, usually only the men’s basketball and football programs
generate a profit for the athletic department.155
FIGURE 1: Men’s Sports
Revenue

Expense

Profit

Football

$63,951,571.00

$19,707,442.00

$44,244,129.00

Basketball

$9,464,520.00

$6,866,541.00

$2,597,979.00

Baseball

$541,073.00

$1,678,780.00

-$1,137,707.00

Tennis

$9,867.00

$507,705.00

-$497,838.00

Golf

$14,400.00

$375,499.00

-$361,099.00

Total

$44,845,464.00

151. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2014) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
152. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2014) (“Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be
interpreted to require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the
members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally supported
program or activity, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any
community, State, section, or other area: *Provided*, That this subsection shall not be construed to
prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this chapter of statistical evidence tending
to show that such an imbalance exists with respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of,
any such program or activity by the members of one sex.”).
153. See Buzuvis, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
154. See id. at 320; Kristi Dosh, Which Sports Turn A Profit?, THE BUSINESS OF COLLEGE SPORTS,
(July 19, 2011), http://businessofcollegesports.com/2011/07/19/which-sports-turn-a-profit/.
155. See infra Figures 1-2; Dosh, supra note 154 (showing the profits from the University of
Florida’s men’s and women’s athletic programs).
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FIGURE 2: Women’s Sports
Revenue

Expense

Profit

Golf

$4,932.00

$314,413.00

-$309,481.00

Basketball

$45,361.00

$2,182,324.00

-$2,135,963.00

Tennis

$0.00

$516,992.00

-$516,992.00

Soccer

$0.00

$757,538.00

-$757,538.00

Volleyball

$78,418.00

$1,008,438.00

-$930,020.00

Softball

$39,655.00

$908,338.00

-$868,683.00

Gymnastics

$236,819.00

$1,063,242.00

-$826,423.00

Lacrosse

$0.00

$600,624.00

-$600,624.00

Total

-$6,946,724.00

This dynamic is the same for schools across the country; therefore,
many believe that providing an equal amount of funds to women’s athletics
will decrease the amount of money that each university is willing to
provide to their student–athletes.156 Since college sports is a multibilliondollar growth industry,157 it is hard to believe that schools would reserve
the amount of money they are willing to provide for student–athletes and
pass up the opportunity to enroll the top recruits in college sports.158
In determining how to distribute funds, schools weigh the college
“educational athletic programs”159 versus “commercial athletic
programs.”160 Education-based athletic programs would allow schools to
evenly distribute funds throughout the athletic department to women’s
sports because less money spent on recruiting football and basketball
prospects would alleviate the pressure to generate revenue from those
156. See Marc Edelman, The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win for the
Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student–athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the
Demise of College Sports, 92 OREGON L. REV. 1019, 1047 (2014).
157. See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Playing in The Red, WASHINGTON POST, (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/sports/wp/2015/11/23/running-up-the-bills/.
158. See Trail of Tears, supra note 16, at 646.
159. See Buzuvis, supra note 21, at 336 (“[A] system like that of the Ivy League and Division III,
in which financial aid is awarded based in need rather than athletic participation.”).
160. See id. at 335 (referring to schools that generate the majority of their money from revenue
sports such as football and men’s basketball).
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sports.161 Furthermore, the idea is that educational programs save money
from electing not to give athletic scholarships and only competing with
regional schools.162 However, a commercial athletic program has the ability
to generate money outside of its affiliation with the academic institution.163
These programs are largely more successful in maximizing profits from
recruiting the top athletes and competing against other major programs
across the country, but are constantly determining how to distribute funds
to less profitable women’s athletics.164 Consequently, if the NCAA decides
that it will compensate Division I men’s basketball and FBS football
student–athletes, it must determine how to factor in compensating women’s
athletes as well as the possibility of income taxes.165
B. Taxation Without Representation
While the tax issue as a whole is beyond the scope of this note, it is
important to briefly identify the ramifications when considering the idea of
compensating student–athletes for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses.166 Since states have a constitutional right to tax, paid student–
athletes would be subject to federal and state income taxation.167 Such a
situation would ultimately make student–athletes employees of their
respective schools, which is a contradiction of the NCAA’s focus toward
amateurism.168 Additionally, the big-name college athletic programs within
the top five conferences169 would have a competitive advantage as well as
the power to control where all of the best recruits go to school.170 Even
though schools within the top five conferences already control a large
portion of the recruiting market, their power would increase because of the
amount of money they have to offer in compensation.171

161. See id. at 338.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 339.
164. See id.
165. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)-(b) (2014); 26 U.S.C. § 61 (2012).
166. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (defining gross income as all income from whatever source derived,
including but not limited to: compensation for services and income from business).
167. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
168. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 23, at 32.
169. See
WIKIPEDIA,
Power
Five
conferences,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_Five_conferences (the top five conferences are the Atlantic Coast
Conference (ACC), Southeastern Conference (SEC), Pacific 12 (Pac-12), Big 12, Big Ten) (last updated
Feb. 15, 2017, at 19:27).
170. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 23, at 36.
171. See id. (“The influence of the jock tax could also impact the entirety of college athletics
should student–athletes be paid.”).
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Depending upon how much money the student–athlete receives and
the state in which he chooses to attend school, he may be subject to state
income taxes.172 Most states have a different income-tax percentage, while
some do not have an income tax at all, which may affect where potential
student–athletes choose to attend school.173 Schools with more money will
still have the power to entice potential student–athletes to enroll at their
university because the earning opportunities are high regardless of the state
income-tax percentage.174 However, schools in states with no income tax
could begin to dominate the recruiting market.175 Since schools often solicit
athletes to transfer with opportunities for more playing time, the additional
incentive of lower or non-taxable income could increase student–athlete
transferring across the nation.176 A situation like this could disrupt the
competitive balance among college sports and certainly redirect a student–
athlete’s emphasis toward monetary goals instead of academics.177
While O’Bannon precludes the NCAA from prohibiting student–
athlete compensation, the NCAA intends to maintain an emphasis on
academics.178 Furthermore, with Title IX and tax implications lingering as
potential obstacles, it could be difficult for the NCAA to compensate
athletes and maintain its core values.179 However, a viable solution is to
allow schools to compensate student–athletes with merit–based
scholarships.180
IV. SHOW THEM THE MONEY: HOW TO COMPENSATE ALL STUDENT–
ATHLETES

The major economic advancement that O’Bannon has provided to
college athletes is a well-deserved victory.181 For years, student–athletes
have increased the demand and revenue for their respective colleges and
172. See id. at 31-32.
173. See id.
174. See id.; Parlow, supra note 113 and accompanying text.
175. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 23, at 31-32.
176. See id. (stating that there could be an increase in transfer requests for athletic programs located
in no-income-tax states).
177. See id. at 30 (recognizing that top athletic programs in Florida and Texas would benefit from
having greater national interest from elite student–athletes).
178. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
179. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 23; Buzuvis, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
180. See discussion infra Part IV (providing a solution to compensating student–athletes that
complies with Title IX and prevents students from paying taxes); IRS, PUBLICATION 970 TAX BENEFITS
FOR EDUCATION 1, 5 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p970.pdf (“A scholarship . . . is tax free
(excludable from gross income) only if you are a candidate for a degree at an eligible educational
institution.”).
181. See Jamieson, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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universities, the NCAA, and collegiate sports in general, but have not
received any compensation.182 Nonetheless, this remedy provides other
legal questions, some of which are not as easy to answer.183 Title IX may
be an easy problem to solve, but allowing student–athletes to receive
compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses while
maintaining the amateurism of college athletics is more of a daunting task,
especially when coupled with tax implications.184 After the Court of
Appeals decided that the NCAA did not have to compensate student–
athletes with yearly deferred cash payments in excess of the cost of
attendance, there seemed to be no reasonable alternative to provide
payments to college athletes while maintaining the NCAA’s amateur
status.185
However, a viable solution to this dilemma is for the NCAA to allow
schools to use the revenue generated from licensing student–athletes’
names, images, and likenesses to create performance-based scholarships.186
The scholarships would be granted from both schools and conferences to
the student–athletes that excel in both academic and athletic endeavors.187
The scholarships would be awarded at the end of each semester so that
students’ grades are factored in to determining the eligibility of the
potential recipients.188 Moreover, the performance-based scholarship
opportunities would be available in every NCAA sport at each respective
school like the NCAA All-American and All-Conference awards.189 Those
who support paying student–athletes may argue that this solution is not a
plausible remedy because it does not fully compensate all revenuegenerating athletes.190 While this solution does not compensate all Division
I men’s basketball and FBS football student–athletes, it does create an
additional remedy to the O’Bannon decision since there is a void of
direction for the NCAA.191 Moreover, the scholarship amounts could be
182. See Trail of Tears, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
183. See discussion supra Part III (identifying potential Title IX and income tax consequences of
the O’Bannon decision).
184. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)-(c); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
185. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015); NCAA
2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 25, at 24 and text accompanying notes 39-41.
186. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075-77 (stating the NCAA did not have to allow schools to
provide students with cash payments).
187. See Johnson, supra note 15; Taha, supra note 84, at 87.
188. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3.c. (discussing the NCAA’s promotion of integrating
education and athletics).
189. See Harrison, supra note 108 and accompanying text.
190. See Dosh, supra note 154.
191. See Solomon, supra note 19; O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075-77 (stating that the NCAA may not
prohibit student–athlete compensation, but does not say it must compensate student–athletes).

2017

MODIFYING AMATEURISM

283

structured relative to the popularity of the sport, meaning that the Division I
men’s basketball and FBS football scholarships would be more lucrative
than all of the nonrevenue-generating sports like tennis or golf.192
On the other hand, those against paying student–athletes may argue
that awards of large amounts could take away from the amateur aspect of
the NCAA and change the focus toward a monetary goal.193 Yet, any award
amount under $10,000 could be considered within the scope of
amateurism.194 For example, college tennis players are allowed to gain
amateur status even if they have received up to $10,000 in prize money
prior to enrolling in college.195 To ensure that the awards are not too large,
the cap on the scholarships would be set to $5,000, which was the same
amount proposed for the deferred cash payments.196 However, unlike the
deferred cash payments, performance-based scholarships allow student–
athletes to maintain their amateur status because the awards are tied to
education: These awards are based upon the merit of their academic
achievements in addition to athletics.197
This solution, in addition to the Court of Appeals authorizing the
NCAA to allow schools to award athletic scholarships up to the full cost of
attendance, would compensate male and female student–athletes in both
revenue and nonrevenue generating sports.198 Moreover, this solution
would provide future college athletes with the opportunity to consent to
licensing their names, images, and likenesses in the live telecast, video
game, and archival footage markets.199 Lastly, this solution allows the
NCAA to maintain its core value of amateurism in college sports while
preventing student–athletes from becoming employees and subjecting
themselves to income taxes.200 Overall, merit-based academic and athletic
scholarships are the most reasonable solution to compensating student–
athletes for the revenue generated from licensing their names, images, and
likenesses without jeopardizing amateurism.201

192. See supra Figures 1-2; Dosh, supra note 154.
193. See Johnson, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
194. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1080.
195. See id.
196. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
197. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1077 (stating that the district court erred in allowing cash
payments untethered to education expenses).
198. See id. at 1075-76; Buzuvis, supra note 21; Edelman, supra note 156.
199. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.2. (identifying the markets where student–athletes’
names, images, and likenesses gain revenue).
200. See NCAA 2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 25, at 20.
201. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1077.
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A. Compensating Male and Female Student–athletes
Title IX is an obstacle that all colleges and universities will need to
comply with even though O’Bannon only requires paying Division I men’s
basketball and FBS football student–athletes.202 Although women’s college
sports programs typically do not generate as much revenue as their male
counterparts, it is essential that women’s athletics receive an equal amount
of funding to prevent discrimination scrutiny under Title IX.203 While some
may argue that paying both male and female student–athletes limits the
amount of funds that are available because the funds will be split in half, it
is the only way for schools to avoid a potential lawsuit from any female
college athlete.204
The solution to this problem is not only providing performance-based
scholarships to women’s basketball and softball players, who are usually
the most popular among women’s college athletics, but also providing
merit scholarships to all student–athletes.205 Even though FBS football and
Division I men’s basketball are the bread winners in collegiate athletics,
nonrevenue-generating sports programs should also be entitled to the
opportunity to receive performance-based scholarships.206 Since it is likely
that only revenue-generating athletes will be allowed to receive athletic
scholarships up to the full cost of attendance, providing merit-based
scholarships to nonrevenue-generating athletes as well creates a balance
among collegiate athletics.207 In terms of public policy, creating a balance
among the various college sports is essential to promoting fairness, which
would help prevent lawsuits against the NCAA for only accommodating
FBS football and Division I men’s basketball players.208
The rebuttal to any solution involving paying student–athletes is the
question of where the money will come from.209 However, the excess
money from the years of limited grant-in-aid to student–athletes may be
used to distribute funds throughout college athletics.210 Moreover, another
source of funding would be the portion of revenue, generated from
licensing student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses, that was
202. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)-(c) (2014); Parlow, supra note 113, at 211; Buzuvis, supra note 21.
203. See Dosh, supra note 154; 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
204. See Buzuvis, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
205. See discussion supra Section III.A.
206. See Dosh, supra note 154.
207. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015).
208. See id.
209. See Buzuvis, supra note 21; Trail of Tears, supra note 16.
210. See discussion supra Part I (providing a brief history of the NCAA’s restrictions on student–
athlete compensation).
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previously used to consistently update training facilities and overpay
coaches and training staff.211 Because the NCAA was concerned that
money would separate student–athletes from the rest of the college student
body, one would believe that the NCAA wants to maintain equality
throughout collegiate athletics.212 Therefore, this solution to compensate
both male and female student–athletes in all sports through performancebased scholarships would coincide with the NCAA’s vision of promoting
fairness and equality.213
B. Student–athlete Consent Options
The next dilemma is slightly more difficult than the Title IX
problem.214 Because the NCAA can no longer prevent student–athletes
from receiving compensation for licensing their names, images, and
likenesses, the task is determining how to allow compensation without
destroying the amateurism of collegiate athletics.215 The proposal is to
modify the amateur status requirements and provide student–athletes with
the opportunity to consent to the use of their names, images, and
likenesses.216 A consent form would be presented upon the student–
athlete’s acceptance to enrolling at the university.217 With this form, the
student–athlete may either consent to the use of his or her name, image, and
likeness in live game broadcast, video games, and highlight clips, or merely
choose to not be identified in such media markets.218 While consent to this
form does waive the student–athlete’s right to bring action on that matter, it
prevents him from destroying his amateur certification.219 However, when
the student–athlete consents to the NCAA licensing on his behalf, he will
be eligible to receive a portion of the revenue through the performancebased scholarships.220 Moreover, this option would allow the NCAA to
reopen the college video game market that has been shut down due to cases
like Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc. and Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., both of
211. See Jamieson, supra note 65 and accompanying text; Isidore, supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
212. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3.c.
213. See id.
214. See Parlow, supra note 144 and accompanying text.
215. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3.a; NCAA 2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 25.
216. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2014);
NCAA 2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 38 and text accompanying note 41.
217. See discussion supra Part II; NCAA 2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 25.
218. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.2.
219. See NCAA 2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 25 (stating that student–athletes must be certified as
amateurs).
220. See discussion supra Section II.A.
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which involved students suing for right to publicity and later joining the
O’Bannon case.221
It is arguable that this option is no different from the NCAA’s current
restrictions because it does not guarantee that student–athletes will receive
a portion of the revenue that they generate.222 However, with the consent
option the result is that the athlete is able to remain an amateur instead of
having to consider the foreign professional or minor league opportunities
that some athletes have chosen due to their academic issues.223
Furthermore, without consenting to allow the NCAA to control licensing,
the student–athlete not only passes on an opportunity to possibly receive
more compensation, but he also passes on the chance for exposure through
each of the relevant media markets.224
Conversely, there is the possibility that some incoming student–
athletes may choose to opt out of licensing their names, images, and
likenesses through the NCAA.225 In this situation, each of those students
may attempt to license their names, images, and likenesses directly in each
market, which could start a trend of students contracting their own
licensing agreements.226 However, it is more likely that student–athletes
would be unsuccessful in that attempt because the media markets would
prefer to have group licensing contracts rather than individual licensing
contracts.227 Additionally, television networks and third-party agents such
as T3Media only contract licensing deals exclusively with the NCAA or its
member conferences and schools.228 Thus, providing a licensing consent
option for incoming student–athletes, would allow the NCAA to minimize
future legal issues involving compensation.229 Likewise, student–athletes
could maximize their compensation opportunities with consent to the
NCAA licensing option.230

221. See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1272 (9th Cir. 2013).
222. See Edelman, supra note 27 (analyzing the district court’s proposed alternatives to the
NCAA’s wage restraints on college athletics).
223. See NCAA 2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 38; Broussard, supra note 75 (identifying a basketball
player that chose to sign with a foreign professional team rather than join the NCAA); Thamel, supra
note 79 (identifying a basketball player that chose to play in the NBA’s minor league rather than the
NCAA).
224. See Taha, supra note 84 and accompanying text.
225. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.2.
226. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.2.
227. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
228. See id. at 994.
229. See id.
230. See id.; Taha, supra note 84; Berkowitz, supra note 18.
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C. Paying Student–athletes Without Taxation
The final issue, and arguably the most difficult of the three, is
developing a means of compensating student–athletes while avoiding state
and federal tax implications.231 Student–athletes may not necessarily be
subject to state taxes, depending on the state they attend school, but would
certainly be subject to federal income taxes.232 The problem is allowing the
athletes to receive the money they deserve, while preventing them from
reaching employee status.233 Making student–athletes into employees
would certainly defeat any purpose of having the “student” part of
“student–athletes” because the free education is supposed to be their
compensation.234 In addition, many student–athletes already focus heavily
on preparing for competition at both the collegiate and professional level,
but never apply the same amount of effort in the classroom.235
However, with the amount of revenue that the NCAA’s schools
generate from student–athletes through the licensing of their names,
images, and likenesses, many believe college athletes are entitled to more
compensation.236 Those who are against paying student–athletes consider
the tax issue a major problem because of the effects it could have on the
recruiting aspect of college sports.237 The belief is that certain states will
have an advantage because of their lower income tax rates, which would
ultimately disrupt the competitive balance.238 While this stance opposing
compensation may be valid, rewarding athletes through performance-based
scholarships would solve the tax dilemma.239
Scholarships based on performance in the classroom and on the
playing field would provide compensation while preventing student–
athletes from subjecting themselves to income taxes.240 The Internal
Revenue Service allows tax-free scholarships for students at eligible
educational institutions so long as it does not exceed the individual’s
qualified educational expenses, meaning expenses needed for attendance or

231. See discussion supra Section III.B. (examining the possible income tax implications from the
O’Bannon decision).
232. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
233. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3.a. (explaining the NCAA’s focus on preserving
amateurism of college athletics).
234. See NCAA 2015-16 MANUAL, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
235. See Johnson, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
236. See Jamieson, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
237. See discussion supra Section III.B.
238. See Kissa-Schulze, supra note 176 and accompanying text.
239. See Kissa-Schulze, supra note 23.
240. See id.
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enrollment.241 Some may argue that scholarships based on athletic
performance would entice students to direct even more attention to their
athletic endeavors.242 However, the scholarships would also be geared
toward educational values because academic achievement in addition to
athletic performance would be necessary to qualify for the awards.243
Therefore, linking academic achievement with athletic success, will
provide student–athletes with the opportunity to gain compensation without
taxation.244
D. The Benefits of Performance-Based Scholarships
Performance-based scholarships provide the NCAA with the same
amount of benefits as each of its alleged procompetitive justifications for
restricting student–athlete compensation.245 Although they are not
necessary, performance scholarships would be a reasonable alternative to
the NCAA’s restriction on compensation from revenue generated through
the licensing of student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.246 With
proper implementation, the NCAA would be able to preserve amateurism,
maintain competition among its member schools, and integrate academics
and athletics—all while increasing its national exposure.247
Throughout its history, the NCAA has maintained an emphasis on
preserving amateurism in college sports.248 While the rules against
compensation functioned to prevent the NCAA from becoming a minor
league system to professional leagues such as the National Basketball
Association and National Football League, the rules also exploited college
athletes.249 O’Bannon exposed the flaws in the NCAA’s technique to
preserving amateurism, but failed to completely resolve the student–athlete
compensation issue.250 Nonetheless, through performance-based
scholarships, the NCAA could compensate student–athletes without

241. See IRS, supra note 180 (stating that the scholarship may not restrict use for qualified
educational expenses and may not represent payment for teaching, research, or other similar required
services).
242. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
243. See Harrison, supra note 108 and accompanying text.
244. See id.; Kissa-Schulze, supra note 23.
245. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3. (stating that the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications
for restraint were preserving amateurism, maintaining competition among universities, integrating
academics and athletics, and increasing exposure).
246. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
247. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3.
248. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
249. See Trail of Tears, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
250. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1081.
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providing it in a manner that would transform college sports into a minorleague system and ruin its amateur status.251 Furthermore, since the
scholarships would only go to the top-performing student–athletes,
competition among players and schools would increase.252
The NCAA believes that its restrictions on student–athlete
compensation allow it to maintain competition among its member
schools.253 However, performance-based scholarships would also maintain
competition among NCAA schools provided that the conferences are
allowed to award them to student–athletes.254 With conferences providing
scholarships to the top-performing student–athletes from schools within
their respective conferences, schools with the most scholarship-winning
students are now able to pitch another benefit when recruiting future
athletes.255 Although the NCAA will always have disparity among schools
because of size and revenue, competition among schools to recruit the best
athletes would increase because the schools with more successful students
would develop a reputation for exceling in both academics and athletics.256
While performance scholarships would maintain and even increase
competition among schools, it would also further the integration of
education and athletics.257
Implementing performance-based scholarships would contribute to the
integration of academics and athletics.258 Although those who oppose
compensating student–athletes believe it would create a distinct separation
between education and sports, it would actually tie both together and
promote achievement in each endeavor.259 Since eligibility for the
scholarships would be based on athletic performance as well as academic
achievement, student–athletes are encouraged to excel in academics.260
This would motivate student–athletes to excel in other endeavors besides
sports and appreciate the importance of education, thus integrating both
academics and athletics.261
251. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102
(1984) (differentiating collegiate athletics from professional minor league sports).
252. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3.c. (showing the NCAA’s focus on promoting the
integration of education and sports).
253. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 978.
254. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3.b.
255. See Harrison, supra note 108 and accompanying text.
256. See generally Taha, supra note 84.
257. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3.c.
258. See Taha, supra note 84, at 113 (stating that generally college football and basketball players
have lower academic achievement than other college students).
259. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
260. See id.
261. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3.c.
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With the possibility of increasing its national exposure, the NCAA
would more than likely have an interest in performance-based
scholarships.262 The NCAA could face the hurdles of determining when to
implement the scholarships and providing a framework for the amount of
revenue that needs to go toward funding the scholarships.263 Yet, because
performance-based scholarships would increase competition among
schools and conferences, the NCAA as a whole would benefit financially
from elite performances from its student–athletes.264 Moreover, the NCAA
would gain more opportunities for televised games, thus increasing its
exposure to fans across the nation.265
CONCLUSION
The O’Bannon decision was a major event in collegiate athletics.266 As
a result of this decision, student–athletes are finally able to reap the benefits
of their labor on the playing field.267 In order to satisfy the holding in
O’Bannon, the NCAA must allow Division I men’s basketball and FBS
football student–athletes to receive compensation for the use of their
names, images, and likenesses in live game broadcasts, video games,
highlight clips, and other archival footage.268 However, in order to comply
with Title IX, it is necessary for the NCAA also to provide an equal amount
of funds to women student–athletes, which means doubling the amount of
compensation.269 Although compensating both men and women may cause
colleges and universities to offer less money to Division I men’s basketball
and FBS football student–athletes, it is the only way for the NCAA to
comply with both the Sherman Antitrust Act and Title IX.270 With regard to
the possible tax implications, if the NCAA compensates student–athletes
through performance-based scholarships for academic and athletic
achievements, then it would prevent the income tax that students would
face as employees.271
262. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3.d.
263. See generally supra Figures 1-2 (showing an athletic department’s financial breakdown of
revenue, expenses, and profit).
264. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3.d.
265. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 993.
266. See Berkowitz, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
267. See Jamieson, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
268. See Berkowitz, supra note 18 and accompanying text; Solomon, supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
269. See Buzuvis, supra note 21; Parlow, supra note 144.
270. See Buzuvis, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
271. See discussion supra Section III.B. (discussing the possible tax implications when providing
student–athletes with income).
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Performance-based scholarships are a simple solution to the Title IX
problem because it provides not only an equal share of revenue to women’s
college athletics, but to all sports programs—even the nonrevenuegenerating programs.272 These scholarships would maintain balance within
student athletics, while fairly providing compensation for the use of
student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in live game broadcast and
highlight clips.273 Moreover, the idea to provide incoming student–athletes
with consent forms to allow their schools and conferences to sell the rights
of their names, images, and likenesses on their behalf maintains the
amateurism that the NCAA is so adamant about preserving in college
sports.274 Also, the performance-based scholarships solved the complex
issue of paying student–athletes for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses while maintaining their amateur status and avoiding income
taxes.275 Overall, performance-based scholarships would conform to the
O’Bannon decision because it would provide an opportunity to compensate
Division I men’s basketball and FBS football student–athletes for licensing
their names, images, and likenesses.276

272. See discussion supra Section III.A. (discussing the Title IX effects in college athletics).
273. See Dosh, supra note 154 (discussing revenue and nonrevenue sports in both men’s and
women’s athletics).
274. See discussion supra Part I (providing the NCAA’s history of amateurism).
275. See discussion supra Section III.B.
276. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating
that the NCAA may not restrict Division I men’s basketball and FBS football student–athlete
compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses, but did not have to provide
compensation).

